


OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3 May 1961

MEMO FOR MR. McNAMARA

Mr. Nitze's thoughts expressed to you in the attached memorandum have been injected into the JCS studies being transmitted to the President and in the memorandum of transmittal; therefore, I think you can simply note this and thank Mr. Nitze for his work.

The attached JCSM 349-60 is the "check list" which both he and I recommend you review.


George S. Brown

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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JCSM-349-60

12 AUG 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Berlin Contingency Planning (U)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, subject as above, dated 10 June 1960, ^{TS 513} requesting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff furnish you a checklist of those measures which will require your attention and decision, to include, where appropriate, the estimated lead time from decision to achievement of capability.

2. As a result of action by the U.S. Coordinating Group for Berlin Contingency Planning on 23 May 1960, a Working Group composed of representatives from the Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Central Intelligence Agency have prepared a "Checklist of Possible Military and Non-Military Measures - Berlin Contingency Planning." The primary purpose of this checklist is to comply with the instructions of the President resulting from the National Security Council Meeting of 23 April 1959, and to facilitate the action of the U.S. Coordinating Group in making recommendations to the President regarding the selection and timing of appropriate measures in light of the political-military situation existing at the time.

3. It is believed that this checklist, forwarded as the Appendix hereto, provides in large measure the information requested in the referenced memorandum. The checklist does not, however, indicate those measures which require your personal attention and decision inasmuch as the Joint Chiefs of Staff would apprise you of such matters on a case-by-case basis as circumstances warrant.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N. F. Twining
N. F. TWINING,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Attachment (20 pages)

Copy 1 of 9 Copies each
of pages series "A"

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SEC DEF CONT NO. 801

S E C R E T

A P P E N D I X

CHECK LIST OF POSSIBLE MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY MEASURES,
BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

BACKGROUND:

As a result of the 23 April 1959 NSC Meeting, the President approved in principle, Studies related to further Berlin Contingency Planning under the U.S. Coordinating Group for Berlin Contingency Planning. The Group is chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs with representatives of the Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Special Assistant to the President for NSC Affairs. The President specifically charged this group with responsibility for "the development of general political, economic, and Military measures as outlined in the studies, with particular reference to Selection and Timing, with major decisions being referred to the President for approval as necessary."

PURPOSE:

This list has been prepared to facilitate the action of the U.S. Coordinating Group in making its recommendations to the President regarding the selection and timing of appropriate measures in light of the political-military situation at the time.

EXPLANATION:

1. The list is divided into six groups corresponding with the possible developments of the Berlin situation, should the Soviets act in a manner now envisioned. The fact that a particular measure is listed does not indicate in any way a commitment to carry it out and does not signify any rigidity of sequence or priority.

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Appendix

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2. The implementation of any one of the measures listed will be dependent upon the circumstances. The measures listed in the check list may be executed singly, in groups, or in any order not shown in the list.

3. It is anticipated that the attached check list will be added to as additional measures are planned, specifically in the area of indirect countermeasures and possible harassment of German civilian access.

4. The column on the check list, "Approx. Time to Execute (days)", is construed to be an estimated time to implement a specific measure once agreement or decision has been reached.

5. The column on the check list, "Responsible U.S. Agency", is construed to mean the government agency that will have primary responsibility for implementing the specific measure once the agreement or decision has been reached.

6. It should be borne in mind that many of these specific measures will undoubtedly require tripartite agreement prior to execution or in lieu thereof consultation with or notification to tripartite, NATO, or other friendly nations.

7. Covert activities in support of all appropriate measures will be provided by CIA and other government agencies.

CHECK LIST OF POSSIBLE MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY MEASURES

A. EAST-WEST TENSION INCREASED AND/OR SOVIET TURN-OVER IMMINENT:
PURPOSE - TO DEMONSTRATE DETERMINATION

<u>No.</u>	<u>Measure</u>	<u>Approx. Time to Execute (days)</u>	<u>Responsible U.S. Agency</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1.	Continue efforts to seek tripartite agreement on all details of measures implementing 4 April 1959 paper.	Continuing	State	
2.	Continue close consultation with Congressional leaders and frequent reports to the American people by the President and other high U.S. officials on the developing Berlin situation.	Variable	State and officials concerned	
3.	Public relations actions to obtain support for U.S. views and to demonstrate U.S. determination.	Variable	State, Defense & USIA	Exchange visits by prominent Germans, people-to-people arrangements involving U.S.-Berlin; publications, public correspondence, etc.
4.	Utilize frequent opportunities to inform leaders of friendly and uncommitted countries about the Allied position on Berlin and Germany.	Variable	State & USIA	State to provide guidance to diplomatic posts through circular instructions, texts of important speeches and other appropriate background information. Be alert to accept and exploit voluntary declarations of solidarity with Allied.

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No.	Measure	Approx. Time to Execute (days)	Responsible U.S. Agency	Remarks
5.	Conduct a coordinated world-wide information campaign aimed at popularizing positive aspects of the Allied position on Berlin and Germany, including self-determination.	Variable	State & USIA	aims made by non-Allied free world leaders, e.g. exploit opportunities to influence favorably newly independent nations particularly those emerging in Africa.
6.	Report to NATO on progress of our planning to extent required.	1 - 2	State	To maintain a state of readiness to approve tripartite actions and, if necessary, to support them actively.
7.	Provide continuous air surveillance along Greenland, Iceland, and the U.K. line.	3	JCS	Inform, and/or consult as appropriate, Tripartite and NATO authorities.
8.	Execute anti-submarine surveillance at Straits of Gibraltar and in the Turkish Straits, with visible patrolling.	7	JCS	Inform, and/or consult as appropriate, Tripartite and NATO authorities.
9.	Seventh Army to conduct exercises in Central Europe.	5	JCS	A political decision is required and tripartite and NATO authorities will be informed and/or consulted prior to execution.
10.	Utilize air corridors at altitudes in excess of 10,000 feet.	1	State & JCS	

No.	Measure	Approx. Time to Execute (days)	Responsible U.S. Agency	Remarks
11.	Seventeenth Air Force to conduct exercises in Europe.	2	JCS	
12.	Sixth Fleet to conduct carrier operations in Central and Eastern Mediterranean.	1	JCS	
13.	Leak the existence of a tripartite military staff responsible for tripartite military planning and operations.	10	JCS	Other implementing agencies to be determined after decision is made to execute.
14.	Conduct a tripartite military exercise which could be easily identified with the problem of forcing access to Berlin via the autobahn.	2	State & JCS	Tripartite agreement must be reached.
15.	Have key military leaders of France, the U.K., U.S., and West Germany meet with General Norstad at the time political negotiations over the Berlin issues reach an impasse.	2	State & JCS	Tripartite agreement must be reached.
16.	Assemble key tripartite commanders at Paris for readiness conference.	2	State & JCS	
17.	Tighten control over Soviet Bloc personnel at U.S. Frontiers, ports, and airports as evidence of increased caution.	2	State & other U.S. agencies	As appropriate, seek Tripartite and NATO cooperation in extension of restrictions. Require additional documentation, inspection, or other technical requirements to delay or inconvenience Soviet Bloc shipping.
18.	Increase air activity along USSR radar barrier.	2	JCS	

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No.	<u>Measure</u>	<u>Approx. Time to Execute (days)</u>	<u>Responsible U.S. Agency</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
19.	Seek UN Security Council Resolution.	1	State	Tripartite agreement must be reached. Draft resolution in hands of West UN Permanent Representatives. Might need revision.
20.	Intensify planning for appropriate economic measures.	Variable	State	State will prepare such measures.
21.	When imminent turnover of checkpoints is announced by the Soviet Government, issue public statement covering proposed allied intentions and send note to Soviet Government.	Variable	State	To be delivered and/or published at time turnover is officially confirmed, an agreed draft may be amended from time to time and in light of actual Soviet/GDR statements and actions.

B. SOVIETS TURN-OVER TO THE GDR: PURPOSE - TO CONTINUE TO DEMONSTRATE ALLIED DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN RIGHTS AND TO FORCE SOVIETS TO ACKNOWLEDGE THEIR BASIC RESPONSIBILITIES

No. Measure	Approx. Time to Execute (days)	Responsible U.S. Agency	Remarks
1. Review foregoing measures for continuation, reiteration, or if not already executed, for implementation.	1	State	To be delivered and/or published at time turn-over is officially confirmed. Agreed draft may be amended from time to time and in light of actual Soviet/GDR statements and actions.
3. Establish anti-submarine barrier patrol along Greenland-Iceland-U.K. line.	14	JCS	Inform tripartite and NATO authorities, and/or consult as appropriate, and request U.K. to maintain Faeroes-U.K. portion of barrier.
4. Execute identification, checkpoint, and BASC procedures.	1	State & JCS	Identification and movement order forms for surface travel on hand in Berlin and Bonn. Western BASC controller's statements tripartitely agreed.
5. Produce and stockpile appropriate maps.	10	JCS	

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No.	Measure	Approx. Time to Execute (days)	Responsible U.S. Agency	Remarks
6.	Bring appropriate U.S. military forces in Europe to full strength.	30	JCS & State	Urge U.K. and France to do likewise. Advise NATO. This selective reinforcement will seriously degrade the combat effectiveness of other forces from which these resources are diverted. Therefore, consideration must be given and decision made at this time as to alternative methods of building up active duty forces to compensate for this action.
7.	Place SAC and other selected military forces on a higher degree of alert.	1	JCS	Urge U.K. and France to do likewise. Advise NATO.
8.	Suspend normal military personnel rotation policy to and from Europe, and stop dependent travel to Europe.	7	OSD	
9.	Alert selected elements of reserve components as to possibility of recall, warning them to put personal affairs in order.	5	OSD	
10.	Augment military guards at autobahn checkpoints, on trains and at Allied airfields in Berlin.	2	JCS	
11.	Initiate tripartite military police patrols of the autobahn, on a 24-hour basis, announcing tripartite assumption of responsibility for traffic to and from Berlin.	2	State & JCS	Tripartite agreement must be obtained.
12.	Organize all military autobahn traffic to and from Berlin in tripartite convoys escorted by armed MP's equipped with two-way communication equipment.	2	State & JCS	Tripartite agreement must be obtained.

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No.	Measure	Approx. Time to Execute (days)	Responsible U.S. Agency	Remarks
13.	Increase tripartite utilization of the autobahn and air corridors to Berlin.	2	State & JCS	
14.	Utilize increased military traffic to Berlin to increase the stockpile of weapons and ammunition.	Variable	JCS	
C. GDR/SOVIET ACTIONS RESULT IN FORMALITIES OR CONTROLS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIES: PURPOSE - TO FURTHER DEMONSTRATE DETERMINATION				
1.	Review foregoing measures for continuation, reiteration, or if not already executed, for implementation.			
2.	If not already under discussion, seek early agreement with the U.K. and France on precise nature and timing of further steps to be taken in the UN, e.g., action in General Assembly.	2 - 5	State	Once initiated would probably require continuous consultation until action completed.
3.	Increase frequency of consultation and reports to NATO to insure close support of NATO Allies on all phases of the Berlin issue.	Variable	State	Tripartite agreement is required.
4.	If appropriate, consult with SEATO, CENTO and/or OAS to gain support for all phases of proposed allied action on Berlin.	Variable	State	
5.	Alert COMUS-based forces for possible deployment	1	JCS	
6.	Alert appropriate agencies for civil defense readiness.	1	OSD - OCDM	
7.	Review plans for mobilization of industry.	30	OSD - OCDM	
8.	Make known to free world governments, as appropriate, certain U.S. reprisal measures that may be executed.	2	State	Reprisal may include economic or limited military measures.

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<u>No.</u> <u>Measure</u>	<u>Approx. Time to Execute (days)</u>	<u>Responsible U.S. Agency</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
9. Conduct global countermeasures to exert pressure on Soviets to cease harassments against Berlin.	Variable	State, OSD, JCS, and other appropriate agencies.	Tripartite and possibly NATO or other regional organizational consultation, as appropriate.
10. Utilize appropriate channels to convince the Soviet Union that the U.S. has made atomic weapons available to the military forces of West Germany and France.	30	OSD, JCS, CIA, AEC, and other appropriate agencies.	To be implemented only if authorized by proper authority, and if the facts indicate this is a true statement.
11. Prepare to reinforce EUCCOM with appropriate military forces.	Variable	JCS	This selective reinforcement will seriously degrade the combat effectiveness of other forces from which these resources are diverted. Therefore, consideration must be given and decision made at this time as to alternative methods of building up active duty forces to compensate for this action.
12. Move the following military forces under cover of rotation, and/or scheduled exercises:	30	JCS	
a. Army combat forces augmentation equivalent to division strength with essential logistic units to Europe.	10		Size of force dependent upon situation at the time.
b. Elements of 2d Fleet to war stations, exercising from U.K. ports and in Norwegian Sea.	10 - 18		Size of force dependent upon situation at the time.
c. Fleet Marine Force augmentation to the Mediterranean.	10 - 18		Size of force dependent upon situation at the time.
d. ASW augmentation forces to Mediterranean.			

No.	Measure	Approx. Time to Execute (days)	Responsible U.S. Agency	Remarks
	e. Tactical fighter force of no more than 5 squadrons to Europe.	2		Size of force dependent upon situation at the time.
	f. Troop carrier squadrons to Europe.	2		
13.	Hints of the possible nature of resort to force contemplated by the Allies should be leaked.	10	State, OSD, JCS, and other appropriate agencies.	
14.	Step-up reconnaissance flights in the air corridors.	7	JCS	
15.	Consider the occupation of the Steinmuecken exclave and the exercise of the rights of access thereto.	2	JCS	Presumably we would want British to do same with exclaves of their sector. Requires basic decisions as to usefulness and timing.
16.	Intensify and coordinate reconnaissance activity (electronics and visual), hinting at increased technological capabilities for surveillance.	10	JCS	
17.	The tripartite military powers in Europe implement appropriate alert measures to include, but not limited to: a. Intensification of security against sabotage and subversion. b. Bringing of air defense systems up to strength. c. Reinforcement of frontiers and refugee control.	5	State, OSD, & JCS	Tripartite Powers agreement to be secured with information to NATO.

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No.	Measure	Approx. Time to Execute (days)	Responsible U.S. Agency	Remarks
	d. Implementation of the first stage of the ACE Communications-Electronics Plan.	2		
	e. Preparation of selected forces for deployment.	5		
18.	Cancel routine out-of-area exercises and increase in-place exercises.	15	JCS	
19.	Intensify security restrictions on indigenous employees.	10	All appropriate agencies	
20.	Control radio traffic over European area to indicate increased alert.	2	JCS	
21.	Augment and vary pattern of detectable communications activity.	5	JCS	
22.	Increase troop information programs in units.	2	JCS	
23.	Intensify atomic training of tripartite and other allied forces.	7	State & JCS	Will require tripartite agreement.
24.	Turkish Forces with U.S. and U.K. submarines to conduct exercises in Black Sea and along Turkish Coast within terms of Montreaux Convention.	30	State & JCS	Turkish and U.K. agreement must be reached. NATO informed.
25.	Request active patrolling by Italian light forces in Straits of Otranto to maintain surveillance of Albanian ports, with particular attention to submarine activities.	10	State	Italian agreement must be reached. NATO informed.

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<u>No.</u>	<u>Measure</u>	<u>Approx. Time to Execute (days)</u>	<u>Responsible U.S. Agency</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
26.	Increase degree of alert for all combatant commands.	1	JCS	
27.	Movement and reinforcement of British, French, and German military forces.	Variable	State	
28.	Take further action to pre-stock airfields.	10	JCS	
29.	Resolve, at least temporarily, special weapons storage problems affecting readiness.	Variable	State, OSD, & JCS	
30.	Accelerate deployment of missile units to West Germany.	Variable	State & OSD	
31.	Issue appropriate maps on a limited scale.	10	JCS	
32.	Arrange for temporary storage of weapons in additional delivery units.	15	State, OSD, & JCS	
33.	Take preliminary steps to arrange for U.S. access to foreign ports, staging areas, airfields, communication facilities, etc.	10	State	
34.	Withdraw military dependents and non-essential personnel from West Berlin.	5	State, OSD & JCS	Announce that evacuation is designed to permit forces greater freedom of action.
35.	Discontinue tourist and non-essential traffic to Europe.	5	State	To be executed concurrently with above item.
36.	Supplemental funding to meet the requirement imposed by the period of heightened tension.	Variable	OSD	

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D. UNACCEPTABLE CONTROLS HAVE RESULTED IN INTERRUPTION OR SUSPENSION OF TRAFFIC (AIR OR GROUND):
PURPOSE - TO EXECUTE A PROBE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE USSR/GDR WILL USE FORCE TO PREVENT ALLIED ACCESS TO BERLIN

No.	Measure	Approx. Time to Execute (days)	Responsible U.S. Agency	Remarks
1.	Review foregoing measures for continuation, reiteration, or if not already executed, for implementation.	5	JCS	Detailed measures of all appropriate government agencies, including military measures in accordance with current plans, would accompany such a recommendation.
2.	Step-up active national defense measures world-wide.	15	OSD & OCDM	
3.	Step-up Civil Defense Measures.	3	State & JCS	
4.	Final tripartite determination of size and composition of forces to be used in the context of existing political-military situation.	1	White House	
5.	Promulgate a Presidential declaration of a national emergency.			
6.	Initiate appropriate mobilization.	30	OSD	
7.	Deploy additional forces to Europe.	Variable	JCS	

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No.	Measure	Approx. Time to Execute (days)	Responsible U.S. Agency
8.	Inform NATO in advance, seeking resolution or other evidence of solidarity in support of contemplated ground action.	3 - 5	State
9.	Immediately preceding the entry of the Allied ground forces into the Soviet zone, the President should announce that this force will seek peacefully to transit the established autobahn route to Berlin.	2	State
10.	Provide advance notice to all friendly governments.	2	State
11.	Withdraw non-essential personnel, including dependents, from Europe.	30	State, OSD & JCS
12.	Execute appropriate psychological and unconventional warfare operations.	Variable	OSD, JCS, & CIA
13.	Deploy tripartite force to Helmstedt area.	3	State & JCS
14.	Deploy northern atomic task force wholly or partially to BAOR area.	3	JCS
15.	Step-up and practice alert and combat procedures.	2	JCS
16.	Improve state of readiness of BAOR and RAF/Germany to include movement of combat service support units, and strategic reserve from U.K. to continent.	Variable	State

Approx. Time to Execute (days)

Responsible U.S. Agency

Remarks

Special attention should be given to problems such action would raise for BENELUX and, if necessary, additional consultation arranged.

The force will be instructed not to fire unless fired upon. Would be desirable to have U.K. and French Governments make announcements simultaneously.

No.	Measure	Approx. Time to Execute (days)	Responsible U.S. Agency	Remarks
17.	Establish air courier service between Paris and major tripartite headquarters in Europe and U.K.	3	State & JCS	
18.	Reinforce ADIZ measures and extend them to the Austrian border.	2	JCS	
19.	Execute aircraft squadron dispersal plan.	2	JCS	
20.	Be prepared to execute demolition and mining plans.	1	JCS	
21.	Increase border patrol activity and surveillance.	3	JCS and other appropriate agencies	
22.	Execute SAC airborne alert.	1	JCS	
23.	Execute the probe.	2	JCS	
24.	Initiate a garrison airlift if appropriate substitute military for civilian aircraft to maintain airline services to Berlin.	2	State and JCS	

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E. FURTHER POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS HAVE FAILED AND ALLIED TRAFFIC IS STILL OBSTRUCTED:
PURPOSE - TO MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT TO REOPEN ACCESS TO BERLIN, AND TO DEMONSTRATE
 ALLIED DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN OUR RIGHTS

<u>No.</u>	<u>Measure</u>	<u>Approx. Time to Execute (days)</u>	<u>Responsible U.S. Agency</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1.	Review foregoing measures for continuation, reiteration, or if not already executed, for implementation.		Appropriate Agencies	
2.	Final tripartite determination of the size and composition of forces to be used in the context of the existing political-military situation.	3	State & JCS	Tripartite agreement to be reached on decision to execute.
3.	Seek support of all friendly nations, for contemplated substantial military effort.	14	State	
4.	Review U.S. preparations for rationing.	30	OCDM	
5.	Direct unified and specified commanders to implement selected alert measures contained in their respective alert plans.	1	JCS	
6.	Consult and inform friendly nations and allied organizations, including NAFO, SEAFRO, and GENRO of the seriousness of the situation and urge they take appropriate action including selected alert measures.	14	State	
7.	Execute electronic countermeasures.	2	JCS	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Measure</u>	<u>Approx. Time to Execute (days)</u>	<u>Responsible U.S. Agency</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
8.	Execute naval countermeasures against Soviet and GDR shipping as follows:	Variable	State-OSD-JCS and other appropriate agencies	Tripartite and possible NATO or other regional organizational consultation, as appropriate.
	a. Protracted delay of ship's servicing (bunkering, provisioning, etc.)	2		
	b. Regulate the movement of Bloc ships in Allied ports.	5		
	c. Increase charges to Bloc shipping for bunkering, lightering, piloting and repairs in Allied ports.	2		
	d. Refuse to charter shipping to Bloc countries.	2		
	e. Intensify surveillance of Soviet Bloc fishing fleets in North Atlantic and North Pacific.	3	JCS	
9.	Partial or complete evacuation of hospital patients from forward areas in Europe.	3	JCS	
10.	Execute operation to reopen access.			

F. DECISION HAS BEEN MADE TO ADOPT GENERAL WAR MEASURES*

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No.	Measure	Approx. Time to Execute (days)	Responsible U.S. Agency	Remarks
1.	Review foregoing measures for continuation, reiteration, or if not already executed, for implementation.	2	State, OSD & JCS	The President to inform the people of the gravity of the situation.
2.	Alert Congressional leaders to the imminent likelihood of war, and seek Congressional authorization for use of forces.	30	State	
3.	Diplomatic measures to keep all free governments informed of allied position.	5	State	
4.	Harass and impose increased security restrictions on Soviet military personnel.	2	State-OSD-JCS and other appropriate agencies	Tripartite and possibly NATO or other regional organizational consultation, as appropriate.
5.	Refusal of ship's servicing to Bloc shipping.	15	State, OSD, and other appropriate agencies	
6.	Take civilian political and economic steps in accordance with current plans.	2	State	Tripartite and possibly NATO or other regional organizational consultation, as appropriate.
7.	Close allied ports to Bloc shipping.			

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<u>No.</u>	<u>Measure</u>	<u>Approx. Time to Execute (days)</u>	<u>Responsible U.S. Agency</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
8.	Reinforcement of forces on the European continent.	Variable	JCS	
9.	Mobilize.	60	OSD, JCS, OICDM & other appropriate agencies	
10.	Take any additional and final measures to achieve full U.S. military and civilian defense readiness for general war.	30	All appropriate Government agencies	
11.	Present an ultimatum to the Soviet Government.	2 - 3	State	
12.	Conduct military operations in accordance with current plans.	3	JCS	

* General War Measures could be unilaterally implemented at any appropriate time. However, this goes beyond current tripartite planning.